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Introduction
IMMIGRATION HAS BEEN a perpetual hot topic throughout Ameri-
can history. Debates surrounding immigration policy reform have
spurred several major legislative initiatives over the last fifteen years.
In 1996, Congress made significant changes to immigration law in the
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing with the passage of two laws: the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA") 1 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA").2 Congress's primary purposes in enacting IIRIRA in-
cluded strengthening border patrol, increasing deportation, and
broadening mandatory detention.3 Under the AEDPA, Congress lim-
ited the power of federal judges to grant relief by streamlining proce-
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1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
3. SeeH.R. REP. No. 104-469(I), at 111 (1996) (outlining the need for legislation); see
also id. at 114 ("Congress should establish as a fundamental strategy for immigration en-
forcement the deterrence of illegal migration across the land borders of the United
States."); id. at 123 (noting that the major reason many deportable aliens are not removed
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dures. 4 Several provisions of these laws have codified anti-immigrant
sentiment and resulted in strict enforcement and detention policies.5
Recent congressional efforts have continued to focus on limiting "ille-
gal" immigration through enforcement measures. 6
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is
the federal agency tasked with implementing United States immigra-
tion laws. 7 Since the enactment of the IIRIRA and AEDPA in 1996, the
ICE detainee population has grown steadily.8 In 2007, ICE detained
over 311,000 aliens, with an average daily population of over 30,000.9
The average length of stay for a detainee was thirty-seven days. 10 As
from the United States is due to the inability of the INS to detain such aliens through the
course of their deportation proceedings, thus the law seeks to increase detention space).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 40 (1995) ("Title VI, section 621 ... establishes an
expedited asylum procedure for those individuals who arrive in the United States without
proper immigration documents and fail to demonstrate a credible fear of persecution in
their countries of origin .... Section 623 of title VI subjects illegal aliens to exclusion from
the United States following an administrative adjudication where the alien is found to have
unlawfully entered the United States. Once such a finding is made, the alien will be subject
to expulsion, subject only to administrative review of the exclusion order and habeas
corpus protections. This type of expedited expulsion procedure will apply regardless of the
length of time the illegal entrant has been unlawfully present within the United States. The
provision recognizes that there is an obvious and fundamental difference between aliens,
who entered the United States lawfully and later become deportable, and those whose
initial entry was wholly illegal.").
5. Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 349, 355 (2005) ("With the public being encouraged by some politi-
cal leaders to blame immigrants for economic woes, Speaker Gingrich's Congressional
Task Force on Immigration Reform returned with dramatic proposals. The Congress for-
malized these approaches with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
in April 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) in September 1996."); see also Abby Sullivan, Note, On Thin Ice: Cracking Down on
the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement Policy, 6 HAS-
TINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 101, 117-25 (2009) (discussing the effect of immigration stat-
utes on prosecutorial culture and the negative implications of classifying illegal entry as an
aggravated felony).
6. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 201-02 (2005) (making illegal entry an aggravated
felony).
7. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About ICE, http://www.ice.gov/
about/index.htm (last visited May 5, 2009) (stating ICE's mission "to protect national se-
curity by enforcing our nation's customs and immigration laws").
8. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf.
9. Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 110th Cong. 36 (2008) [hereinafter Detainee Medical Care Hearing] (statement of
Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office).
10. Id.
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the population of immigrants detained by ICE increases, the legal
community must develop workable standards for evaluating detainees'
constitutional rights.
ICE detainees are held pursuant to civil immigration laws. 1 The
detainee population is made up of individuals awaiting immigration
hearings and decisions, as well as individuals who are detained pend-
ing deportation. 12 Women account for ten percent of this detainee
population.1 3 Since most female ICE detainees are asylum seekers
who are fleeing persecution or are victims of other forms of vio-
lence,1 4 they are particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability is exacer-
bated in the context of medical care at detention facilities, where
women's reproductive health is uniquely at issue.
The conflict between immigration, ICE detention policies, and
access to abortion was poignantly captured in a recent expos6 that
tracked Maria, a Honduran woman who was brutally raped during her
journey to the United States. 15 Upon entering the United States, Ma-
ria was picked up by Border Patrol and sent to a detention center
where she was required to take a pregnancy test; the test result was
positive.16 The story continued:
For two months, while Maria awaited her detention hearing, [her
counselor] says they met about once every two weeks to talk about
the ordeal. Maria asked about her options for ending the preg-
nancy. "I can't do it," [the counselor] remembers her saying. "The
baby's face will just remind me of him-the man who did this."
But Maria ran into a practice limiting the reproductive rights of
ICE detainees. For pregnant women in immigration detention fa-
cilities, it is virtually impossible to obtain an abortion .... [the
counselor] told her, "If you weren't in detention, these would be
your options . . . . But while she was detained, it just wasn't a
possibility.' 7
11. SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAwETz, ACLU Nat'l Prison Project, Conditions of Confine-
ment in Immigrant Detention Facilities 2 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
prison/unsr -briefing-materials.pdf (prepared for the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights in preparation for his visit to the United States in May 2007).
12. Michelle Brant & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the
Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 CEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 148 (2008).
13. Nat'l ImmigrantJustice Ctr., The Situation of Immigrant Women Detained in the
United States 1 (Apr. 16, 2007) (briefing paper), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.
org/component/option,com-docman/Itemid,O/task,doc download/gid,48/.
14. Id.
15. Kevin Sieff, Access Denied, TEX. OBSERVER, Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.
texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=2963.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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This account provides a context to better understand the various is-
sues of immigration and detention, and their effect on a woman's ac-
cess to abortion. It also highlights the role that comprehensive
administrative guidelines and clear legal standards could play in pro-
tecting the reproductive rights of women in ICE detention.
No administrative agency has considered whether a woman in
ICE detention has a constitutional right to access abortion services.
However, courts have addressed the broader issue of access to health-
care for ICE detainees,18 as well as for prisoners generally.1 9 This
Comment argues that women in ICE detention have three cognizable
constitutional claims when their right to choose to terminate a preg-
nancy is restricted or denied by detention policies and/or officials.
Part One provides an overview of ICE operations and policies, and a
background on United States constitutional rights for non-citizens.
Part Two outlines the due process fundamental rights framework and
argues it is most effective for challenging detention policies that re-
strict access to abortion services. Part Three charts the Fifth Amend-
ment framework and argues that while useful for challenging
institutional policies or actions of individuals, the framework is most
helpful to support an expansion of detainees' rights to basic health
care under the Due Process Clause. Part Four summarizes the Eighth
Amendment framework and argues it is the most appropriate to sup-
port a claim based on the actions of individual staff members or offi-
cials for denying access to abortion services; however, current
standards have rendered inconsistent outcomes.20 This Comment
concludes that in the absence of federal agency regulations support-
ing a detainee's right to an abortion, female ICE detainees and their
advocates have three viable causes of action available to protect the
right to choose abortion while in ICE detention.
18. See generally Dahlan v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 97 (3d Cir. 2007)
(reviewing detainee's claim that detention center denied him adequate medical care); Ce-
sar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (reviewing detainee's claim that immi-
gration official denied him adequate medical care).
19. See generally Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (reviewing pris-
oner's claim that prison policy requiring a court order to receive an elective abortion vio-
lated her civil rights).
20. This Comment will not address issues related to public funding for abortion
services.
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I. Background
A. ICE Operations
After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush created the Department of
Homeland Security21 ("DHS") in the largest reorganization of the fed-
eral government since the creation of the Department of Defense.
22
During this massive reorganization, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ("INS") was eliminated and its enforcement duties were
transferred to ICE, which became part of the new DHS. 23 ICE en-
forces United States immigration policy through arrest, detention,
and removal of undocumented aliens.24
Immigration enforcement policies such as mandatory detention
and family detention have led to an explosive increase in the ICE de-
tainee population. In December 2007, the average daily detainee pop-
ulation was almost 29,000-a 61% increase from January 2006.25
Congress hoped to address concerns that deportable criminal aliens
frequently fail to appear for their removal hearings by requiring
mandatory detention of certain classes of aliens during proceedings. 26
Family detention policies are the result of Congress's attempt to pro-
mote family values in the context of immigration detention. 27 Previ-
ously, if a family was not released as a unit, the members would be
separated from each other and detained individually: parents re-
21. 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
22. JANE A. BULLOCK, GEORGE D. HADDOW & DAMON P. COPPOLA, Introduction to
Homeland Security 11 (2006).
23. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., History of the Department, http://www.dhs.gov/
xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited May 2, 2009); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE Policies Related to Detainee Deaths and the
Oversight of Immigration Detention Facilities 2 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-52_JunO8.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 104469(I), at 117-19 (1996) ("The INS also admits that some crim-
inal aliens are released from custody prior to having their deportation proceedings com-
pleted. This is often done because of a lack of detention space. These aliens are generally
released on bond; however, some of them do not appear for their deportation hearings
and thus disappear into the general population of illegal aliens.").
27. See H. R. REP. No. 109-79, at 38 (2006) ("[C]hildren apprehended by DHS, even
as young as nursing infants, are being separated from their parents and placed in shelters
operated by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) while their parents are in separate
adult facilities. Children who are apprehended by DHS while in the company of their par-
ents are not in fact 'unaccompanied'; and if their welfare is not at issue, they should not be
placed in ORR custody. The Committee expects DHS to release families or use alternatives
to detention such as the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program whenever possible.
When detention of family units is necessary, the Committee directs DHS to use appropriate
detention space to house them together.").
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mained in adult facilities while children were placed with the Office of
Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") Division for Unaccompanied Chil-
dren's Services. 28 To avoid this separation, ICE opened the T. Don
Hutto Family Residential Facility in Texas to accommodate families in
ICE custody while they await immigration proceedings. 29
Initially, ICE owned and operated eight Service Processing Cen-
ters ("SPCs") that housed detainees.30 To accommodate the growing
detainee population, ICE expanded its detention capacity with seven
Contract Detention Facilities. 31 Additionally, ICE has contracted with
over 350 state and local jails through Intergovernmental Service
Agreements ("IGSAs") to house detainees. 32 Most of the IGSA facili-
ties were not designed to hold a civil detainee population, especially
for an extended period of time. 33 ICE's budget for fiscal year 2008 was
$5.58 billion, $2.38 billion of which was allocated to the Office of De-
tention and Removal Operations34 to fund 32,000 bed spaces. 35 The
Agency dedicated over forty percent of its budget to an operational
office tasked with "identification, apprehension and removal of illegal
aliens from the United States.13 6 This apportionment of resources
demonstrates ICE's commitment to making these activities a priority
and illustrates the growing number of people affected by ICE's
policies.
28. MICHELLE BRANt & EMILY BUTERA, WOMEN'S COMM'N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHIL-
DREN, Locking Up Family Values: The Detention of Immigrant Families 1 (2007), available
at http://www.lirs.org/LockingUpFamilyValues.pdf.
29. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The
ICE T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility: Maintaining Family Unity, Enforcing Immi-
gration Laws (Apr. 2007), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/huttofactsheet.htm.
30. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office
of Detention and Removal, http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/index.htm (last visited May 2,
2009) [hereinafter Office of Detention and Removal].
31. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Deten-
tion Management Program, http://www.ice.gov/partners/dro/dmp.htm (last visited May
2, 2009) (hereinafter Detention Management Program]
32. Id.
33. Detainee Medical Care Hearing, supra note 99, at 90-91 (statement of Mary Meg Mc-
Carthy, Director, National Immigrant Justice Center).
34. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
BUDGET FACT SHEET: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 2, 3 (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/pi/news/factsheets/2008budgetfactsheet.pdf.
35. OFFICE OF DETENTION & REMOvAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
Protecting the Homeland: Semiannual Report on Compliance with ICE National Deten-
tion Standards 5 (2007), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/newsreleases/ar-
ticles/semi_annualdmd.pdf.
36. Office of Detention and Removal, supra note 3030.
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B. ICE Health Standards
Detention standards for all facilities are dictated by ICE's forty-
one Performance Based National Detention Standards, located within
its Detention Operations Manual ("DOM").37 Although ICE provides
detention centers located throughout the country with general guide-
lines, these guidelines are supplemented by specific internal proce-
dures that are individually developed by each facility.38 It is important
to note that the DOM is not legally binding.3 9 Since the standards are
not codified in law, they remain difficult to enforce, thus severely lim-
iting their overall effectiveness. 40 Nevertheless, these standards are in-
formative because they represent the only uniform detention
operations standards ICE promulgates.
Standard twenty-two, which addresses medical care, states that
ICE facilities are expected to provide "[d] etainees... access to a con-
tinuum of health care services, including prevention, health educa-
tion, diagnosis, and treatment. ' 41 As to women's health, the DOM
explicitly states that "[f]emale detainees shall have access to preg-
nancy testing and pregnancy management services that include rou-
tine prenatal care, addiction management, comprehensive counseling
and assistance, nutrition, and postpartum follow-up." 42 Additionally,
detainees have twenty-four-hour access to "sick call" procedures,
which "allow[ ] detainees the unrestricted opportunity to freely re-
quest health care services. '43 The Division of Immigration Health Ser-
vices ("DIHS") provides health care for ICE detainees or arranges for
outside health care services. 44 "On-site medical staff must get approval
37. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Im-
migration Detention Facilities, http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/facilities.htm (last visited Apr.
26, 2009); U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Oper-
ations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention Standards, http://www.ice.
gov/partners/dro/PBNDS/index.htm (last visited May 2, 2009).
38. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DETENTION OPERATIONS MANUAL,
PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 17 (2008) (Standard 22: Medical
Care), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/medicalcare.pdf. [hereinafter
Standard 22: Medical Care].
39. Bran6 & Lundholm, supra note 1212, at 161-62.
40. Id.
41. Standard 22: Medical Care, supra note 3838, at 1.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Detention Management Program, supra note 3131.
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from DIHS to provide medically necessary referrals before treating
detainees. " 45
A separate category of the DOM addresses sexual assault and sets
forth broad standards for facilities regarding prevention and interven-
tion.46 This category has particular significance in instances where a
detainee's pregnancy arises from rape. Standard fourteen, "Sexual
Abuse and Assault Prevention and Intervention," requires that allega-
tions of sexual assault be taken seriously and that victims receive
proper medical attention. 4 7
Other portions of this standard provide for collection of evidence
and transfer outside the ICE detention center to a community facility
for treatment. 48 When these services are provided "in house," guide-
lines explicitly require detention centers to address concerns of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases and mental health affects; 49 however, there is
no explicit mention of pregnancy testing or mandatory availability of
emergency contraception. Inability to obtain emergency contracep-
tion vastly increases the likelihood of an unwanted pregnancy.50
It should also be noted that DIHS's Medical/Dental Detainee
Covered Services Package mentions abortion only to list elective abor-
tion as an "example[ I] of commonly requested procedures that are
not covered but can be requested in the event of an emergency situa-
45. Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls on Congress to Improve and Codify Immi-
gration Detention Standards, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/30437res2007
0710.html (last visited May 2, 2009).
46. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DE-
TENTION OPERATIONS MANUAL, PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 7
(2008) (Standard 14: Sexual Abuse and Assault Prevention and Intervention), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/sexualabuse-andassault.prevention and-in-
tervention.pdf.
47. Id. The standard states:
Staff shall take seriously all statements from detainees claiming to be victims of
sexual assaults and respond supportively and non-judgmentally. Any detainee
who alleges that he or she has been sexually assaulted shall be offered immediate
protection from the assailant and referred for a medical examination and/or a
clinical assessment of the potential for negative symptoms. Staff becoming aware
of an alleged assault shall immediately follow the reporting requirements set forth
in the written policies and procedures.
Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. See Anna Glasier & David Baird, The Effects of Self-Administering Emergency Contracep-
tion, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (1998) (finding that making emergency contraception
more accessible may reduce the rate of unintended pregnancies).
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tion."15 1 This benefits package confuses the nature of elective abortion.
Elective abortions are inherently non-emergency; thus, an ICE de-
tainee's elective abortion would never be covered under the benefits
package provided by DIHS.
Although standards fourteen and twenty-two address medical
care standards for detainees, the Government Accountability Office
("GAO") reported that typical complaints filed by detainees included
"lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment. '52 This is
particularly troubling since many detainees suffer from chronic dis-
eases. 53 Despite the presence of the DOM, Congress, the news media,
and advocates for detainee rights have expressed concern over egre-
gious denials of adequate medical care for detainees. 54 Since 2004,
sixty-two deaths have been reported at ICE detention facilities. 55 The
circumstances surrounding these deaths have spurred much litigation
in the area of detainee medical rights.56
The lack of adequate medical care poses unique concerns for fe-
male detainees. Despite DOM requirements to provide pregnant wo-
men with gynecological services, female detainees housed at the T.
Don Hutto Family Residential Facility reported that they did not re-
ceive adequate prenatal care. 57 The Bush administration's widespread
policies encouraging women to carry pregnancies to term hindered
51. Div. OF IMMIGRATION HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DIHS MEDI-
CAL/DENTAL DETAINEE COVERED SERVICES PACKAGE 26, http://icehealth.org/Managed
Care/Combined%20Benefit%20Package%202005.doc (last visited May 2, 2009).
52. Detainee Medical Care Hearing, supra note 99, at 40 (statement of Richard M. Stana,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
53. Julie L. Myers, Caring for Immigration Detainees, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, at A13
(stating that in 2007, "preexisting chronic conditions were diagnosed and initially treated
in 34 percent of detainees").
54. See, e.g., Detention and Removal: Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 14-15 (2007) [hereinafter Detention and Removal Hear-
ing] (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman); Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of
Neglect, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at Al; Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, In Custody, In Pain,
WASH. POST, May 12, 2008, at Al; Nina Bernstein, US. Issues Scathing Report on Immigrant
Who Died in Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A14; Dan Frosch, Report Faults Treatment
of Women Held at Immigration Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A23; see also 154 CONG.
REC. S4014 (daily ed. May 12, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[A]t a minimum, [de-
tainees] deserve basic medical care while in detention pending the outcome of their immi-
gration proceedings, which often can take years.").
55. Nina Bernstein, New Scrutiny as Immigrants Die in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2007,
at Al.
56. See Complaint, ACLU v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., http://www.aclu.org/images/
asset upload-file33_35774.pdf (action for release of deceased ICE detainee records under
Freedom of Information Act).
57. BRANR & BUTERA, supra note 2828, at 2.
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women's access to unbiased information about reproductive health
and services for abortion.58 Simultaneously, the policies failed to pro-
vide resources for healthy pregnancy. 59 Although President Obama
lifted the widespread prohibition on federal fund distribution to orga-
nizations that provide advice, counseling or information regarding
abortion during his first month in office, 60 his administration has yet
to address concerns surrounding reproductive health care for ICE de-
tainees. Thus, in the absence of binding regulations, detainees must
look to the Constitution for protection.
C. Brief History of Constitutional Protections for Non-Citizens
The Supreme Court has long recognized constitutional protec-
tions for non-citizens. In 1886, the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins6' declared that "[t]he rights of the petitioners . . .are not less,
because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China. ' 62 A
decade later, in Wong Wing v. United States,63 the Court reaffirmed this
holding with regard to non-citizen prisoners. 64 The Court agreed that
the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to the protection of citi-
zens65 and applied this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.66 The Court held:
all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to
the protection guarantied by [the] amendments, and that even
aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor
58. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2208
(2008) (prohibiting the use of federal funds for any abortion). This disproportionately
affects low-income families that may be likelier to receive health services through Medicaid
or Title X of the Public Health Service Act. See Memorandum for the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development: Restoration of the Mexico City Pol-
icy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 216 (Jan. 22, 2008) (reinstating the Mexico City Policy, which condi-
tioned dispersal of United States foreign aid funds on nongovernmental organizations'
agreements not to perform nor actively promote abortion as a method of family planning).
59. See HARRIETrE B. Fox ET AL., MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH POL'Y RESEARCH CTR.,
CHILDREN NOT THE TARGET OF MAJOR MEDICAID CUTS BUT STILL AFFECTED BY STATES' FISCAL
DECISIONS 5 (2004), http://www.mchpolicy.org/documents/MedicaidreportJune2004.pdf
(stating that some states have lowered income eligibility or otherwise made program en-
rollment more burdensome as a cost-sharing strategy).
60. Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning: Memoran-
dum for the Secretary of State [and] the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, 74 Fed. Reg. 4903 (Jan. 28, 2009).
61. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
62. Id. at 368.
63. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
64. Id. at 238.
65. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
66. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
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be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. 67
In these cases, the Court subscribed to a broad view of the Constitu-
tion that included protections for all persons.
Almost a century after Wong Wing, the Supreme Court's approach
to the rights of non-citizens shifted in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez.68 In the context of a Fourth Amendment search of a non-citi-
zen's extraterritorial residence, the Court, in referencing a series of
cases extending constitutional protections to aliens, including Wong
Wing and Yick Wo, stated that although these cases extend constitu-
tional protections to aliens, they "expressly accord[ ] differing protec-
tion to aliens than to citizens. ' 69 Although the Court declined to
extend Fourth Amendment protections in Verdugo-Urquidez, the extent
of constitutional protections for aliens remains unclear.
In a wave of post-9/11 claims, the Supreme Court had occasion to
address the due process rights of individuals detained in the "War on
Terror." During this time, the Court handed down opinions in various
cases that generally affected due process rights of detainees, as well as
the due process rights of non-citizens. 70 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,71 the
Court held that detention of persons captured while fighting against
United States forces in Afghanistan "is so fundamental and accepted
an incident to war as to be an exercise of the necessary and appropri-
ate force Congress has authorized the President to use. '72 While these
individuals may be detained for the duration of the conflict, a citizen-
detainee characterized as an enemy combatant is entitled to "receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral deci-
sionmaker." 73 In Rasul v. Bush,74 the Court stated that United States
courts have jurisdiction to consider writs of habeas corpus by foreign
67. Id.
68. 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).
69. Id.
70. The United States Supreme Court released three related opinions on June 28,
2004: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (recognizing that while the United
States government may detain "unlawful combatants," detainees who are United States citi-
zens may challenge their detention before an impartial judge); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
484 (2004) (holding that United States courts have the authority to decide whether non-
citizens in Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully imprisoned); and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426, 451 (2004) (holding that a detained United States citizen filed his habeas corpus
petition in the wrong jurisdiction).
71. 542 U.S. 507.
72. Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 533.
74. 542 U.S. 466.
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nationals captured in conflict abroad and incarcerated at Guanta-
namo Bay.
7 5
The Court later determined that despite a non-citizen detainee's
classification as a dangerous individual, the procedure of trial and
punishment must observe the "Rule of Law." 76 And just last year, in
Boumediene v. Bush,77 the Court rejected the Government's argument
that non-citizen "enemy combatants" detained at Guantanamo Bay
have "no constitutional rights and no privilege of habeas corpus." 78 It
concluded that those detainees are in fact "entitled to the privilege of
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention." 79 It re-
mains to be seen what effect Boumediene will have on attempts to in-
voke other constitutional rights by non-citizens detained by ICE.
While these cases have created only a thin patchwork of protec-
tions for non-citizens detained by the United States government, they
nonetheless provide a foundation for the notion that non-citizens are
guaranteed rights under the United States Constitution.
II. Fundamental Rights Framework
A. ICE Detainees Are Akin to Prisoners
In many ways, ICE detainees are like inmates in the United States
prison system. Often, detainees are even housed in the same facilities
and subject to similar institutional rules and regulations.80 While
prison inmates are limited in their ability to exercise all of their consti-
tutional freedoms to the full extent of average citizens, "[p] rison walls
do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections
of the Constitution."81 Accounts of persons housed at the T. Don
Hutto family detention facility in Texas suggest that ICE detention
facilities are operated much like prisons. The ACLU has done exten-
75. Id. at 483-84.
76. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567, 635 (2006) ("[T]he military commission
convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures
violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.").
77. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008).
78. Id. at 2244.
79. Id. at 2262.
80. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CustoMs ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DE-
TENTION OPERATIONS MANUAL, PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 3
(2008) (Standard 16: Staff-Detainee Communications), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/PBNDS/pdf/staff detaineecommunication.pdf (noting that ICE Detention Stan-
dards are not specifically applicable to Bureau of Prisons facilities housing ICE detainees).
81. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
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sive work addressing the conditions of ICE detention centers, specifi-
cally with regard to the treatment of children at Hutto.8 2
In response to a complaint filed on behalf of a minor detainee at
the Hutto facility, the United States District Court of the Western Dis-
trict of Texas noted that "the Hutto facility is a converted medium
security prison. It is operated by the Corrections Corporation of
America, a private operator of prisons."8 3
Documents submitted to the court report
unreasonably cold rooms, inadequate medical care, substandard
food, and psychologically abusive guards. Plaintiffs further assert
the facility is run like a prison: there is 24/7 camera surveillance of
residents in both communal and personal living areas, the re-
sidents are escorted everywhere within the facility and are not al-
lowed to move from one area to another by themselves, the facility
has a secure perimeter, and no contact visits are allowed.
[T] he facility and the officers exercise a high level of control over
virtually every aspect of the families' functioning, including things
like what time they get up in the morning, what time they shower,
what time they eat, when their meal stops, where they go, whether
they have access to a game or a toy. That really in every important
respect-in every important aspect of the family's functioning
throughout the day that it's the facility, it's the officers who admin-
ister the rules there that retain control.8 4
Additionally, testimony before the United States House of Repre-
sentatives reported various specific instances in which ICE detainees
were treated like criminals. 85 Among other accounts, the testimony
indicated that the practice of "ICE detainees who are not serving crim-
inal sentences are nonetheless handcuffed and/or shackled when
transported to outside hospitals for medical care and even when in
82. See generally Legal Documents in the ACLU's Challenge to the Hutto Detention
Center, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/28856res20070306.html (last visited
May 2, 2009) (collecting links to complaints filed against Hutto on behalf of detainee-
plaintiffs Yarley Maribel Vasquez Sanchez, Antony Nartatez, Jonathan Nartatez, Fredy
Brisuela, Marco Altamirano, Marusia Razmias, and Saule Bunikyte).
83. Bunikyte ex rel. Bunikiene v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070, at
*4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007).
84. Id. at *5, *7.
85. See Detention and Removal Hearing, supra note 5454, at 14-15 (statement of Fran-
cisco Castaneda, former detainee, testifying that he received inadequate cancer treat-
ment); id. at 44 (statement of Edwidge Danticat, niece of deceased detainee, testifying that
her deceased uncle was refused medical treatment while detained); id. at 47-48 (statement
ofJune Everett, sister of deceased detainee, testifying that her deceased sister was restricted
from receiving her medication and eventually given the incorrect medication).
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their hospital ward."8 6 At a different hearing before the same subcom-
mittee, an attorney with the Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights
Project testified that "[f]acility officials refused to permit the detain-
ees to walk through the prison yard to attend the [legal] orientation,
claiming that they could not allow the detainees to walk unsupervised
through the morning fog."8 7 Taken together, the comprehensive re-
strictions on mobility, as well as other aspects of detainees' daily lives,
forcefully demonstrate that ICE detainees are treated like prison
inmates.
B. The Turner Standard
Prisoners maintain rights under equal protection and due pro-
cess,8 8 and courts have a duty to protect prisoners from regulations or
practices that offend fundamental constitutional guarantees.8 9 The
Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley9° established the basic
framework for evaluating prisoner rights.91 In Turner, prisoners
housed by the Missouri Division of Corrections challenged two regula-
tions: one restricting correspondence between inmates and the other
restricting inmates' ability to marry.92 In order to marry while incar-
cerated, the marriage regulation required an inmate to show a com-
pelling reason for wanting to marry, such as the birth of a child, and
to obtain permission from the superintendent of the prison.93 The
Turner Court, in reviewing the regulations, established a deferential
standard: " [W] hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitu-
tional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
86. Id. (statement of Cheryl Little, Executive Director, Florida Immigrant Advocacy
Center).
87. Problems with Ice Interrogation, Detention and Removal Proceedings: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (statement of Kara Hartzler, Attorney, Flo-
rence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project).
88. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the govern-
ment cannot deny equal protection of the laws. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
617 (2d ed. 2005). Due process provides substantive and procedural protections to ensure
the government does not deny life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. Id.
at 521. Generally, the Supreme Court evaluates the constitutionality of laws according to
the rational basis test, the least onerous standard. Id. at 619. When the law burdens a
"suspect classification" or a fundamental right, the Court applies a stricter standard. Id. at
618-22.
89. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 82.
93. Id.
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mate penological interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if
'prison administrators ... and not the courts, [are] to make the diffi-
cult judgments concerning institutional operations."' 94
The Turner Court applied four factors to determine the reasona-
bleness of the prison's restriction. 95 First, there must be a "valid, ra-
tional connection" between the regulation and the government's
interest; it must be both legitimate and neutral. 96 Second, the court
looked to "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates. '' 97 Third, the Court considered
the "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will
have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally. '9 8 Fourth, the Court considers evidence provided
by the inmate of the existence of an alternative policy that "fully ac-
commodates the prisoner's rights at [de minimis] cost to valid peno-
logical interests."99
In applying the four factors, the Turner Court struck down the
prison's marriage policy.'00 The prohibition on marriage was an exag-
gerated response to security concerns and the prison could have em-
ployed alternative methods that imposed lesser restrictions on
prisoners' constitutional rights without compromising penological
objectives. 101 The Court stated that "the decision to marry (apart from
the logistics of the wedding ceremony) is a completely private one."1 0 2
Thus, the prohibition was not a reasonable restriction on an inmate's
fundamental right to marry.
94. Id. at 89 (quotingJones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). The
rational basis test requires that a law be rationally related to a legitimate government pur-
pose. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540 (3d ed.
2006). "[T]he law will be upheld unless the challenger proves that the law does not serve
any conceivable legitimate purpose .... [It] is enormously deferential to the government."
Id. When the Supreme Court has articulated a rational basis standard, yet applied a more
stringent analysis, the test is said to possess "bite." Id. at 542. One could argue the Court's
scrutiny in Turner is more akin to rational basis "with bite."
95. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
96. Id. at 89-90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
97. Id. at 90.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 81.
101. Id. at 98.
102. Id.
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C. The Fundamental Right to Abortion
Like the right to marry, abortion has also been considered a fun-
damental right by the Supreme Court. Roe v. Wade'03 established that
the constitutional right of personal privacy encompasses a woman's
fundamental right to choose whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. 10 4 In Roe, a pregnant woman seeking a non-therapeutic abor-
tion105  challenged the constitutionality of Texas's statute
criminalizing abortion except when necessary to save the life of the
mother. 10 6 The Court recognized that by denying this choice, the
State would impose various detriments on pregnant women, ranging
from "[s] pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy" to psychological harm and social stigma. 10 7 The Court es-
tablished a trimester timeline to determine the validity of the State's
"important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman ... [and] still another important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life."'1 8 In
striking down Texas' criminal abortion statute, the Court applied
strict scrutiny, requiring the state interest to be compelling and the
regulation to be narrowly tailored.'0 9
Almost twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,110 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic hold-
ing in Roe, while redefining the abortion right as a "liberty interest"
instead of a fundamental right."' In doing so, the Court articulated a
test less onerous than strict scrutiny: the "undue burden" test stipu-
lated that "[o]nly where [a] state regulation imposes an undue bur-
den on a woman's ability to make th[e] decision [to terminate her
pregnancy] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." 2 Under this lower stan-
dard, not every burden on a woman's liberty to choose abortion is
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Id. at 154.
105. "Nontherapeutic abortions are defined as elective, or not necessary to protect the
life or health of the mother, whereas medically necessary abortions are in fact necessary to
preserve a woman's life or health." Richard Guidice Jr., Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the
Right to Procreate Survive Incarceration and Do Legitimate Penological Interests Justify Restrictions
on the Exercise of the Right, 29 FonaAim URB. L.J. 2277, 2316 n.351 (2002).
106. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
107. Id. at 153.
108. Id. at 162.
109. Id. at 155.
110. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
111. Id. at 915.
112. Id. at 874.
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considered undue. 13 An "undue burden" is defined as a regulation
with "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."1 14 This new test
rejected the rigid Roe trimester framework in favor of using viability as
the distinction between a woman's liberty interest and the state's in-
terest in potential life.1 15
In Gonzales v. Carhart,11 6 the Court used the undue burden test to
review the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003, which prohibited the specific abortion procedure of "dilation
and evacuation."' 1 7 The Court held that the absence of a health ex-
ception for the woman and the outright ban on a particular method
of abortion did not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy. 18 Essentially, although a woman's right to
choose abortion has been weakened since Roe, it remains a fundamen-
tal liberty interest protected under due process.'19
D. Applying Turner to Abortion Rights for Prisoners
In the prison context, courts have applied the Turner standard to
evaluate prison policies that impede an inmate's ability to choose
abortion. 120 Assuming that ICE detainees are analogous to female
prison inmates, courts should apply the Turner standard to determine
the validity of an ICE detention center's policy obstructing a female
detainee's access to an abortion. In Roe v. Crawford,'2' a pregnant in-
mate at the Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDC") requested
an abortion, which would require transportation to an off-site pro-
vider. 122 This request was denied based on security and cost considera-
tions.' 23 Another pregnant inmate, 'Jane Roe," initially requested an
abortion at a California correctional facility but was transferred to the
113. Id. at 877.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 878-79 (rejecting the trimester system and instead holding that prior to
viability a state may not prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy).
116. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
117. Id. at 1620, 1626.
118. Id. at 1627.
119. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of
liberty we cannot renounce.").
120. See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d
Cir. 1987); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
121. 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008).
122. Id. at 792.
123. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (W.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 514 F.3d 789
(8th Cir. 2008).
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MDC before she could obtain the procedure.1 24 Upon transferring to
the MDC, Roe again requested abortion services but was denied.12 5
The class of inmates challenged the constitutionality of the MDC's
policy prohibiting transportation of inmates for elective, non-thera-
peutic abortions. 126 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged the Turner bal-
ancing standard as it applied to prison restrictions on the right to
marry and observed that this analysis "[1]ogically . . . holds true for
access to abortions as well."'127 The Eighth Circuit went on to explain
the analogy between marriage and abortion rights: "Certainly, no pris-
oner could simply elect to leave the institution at will to obtain an
abortion. This does not, however, mean any exercise of the right is
entirely inconsistent with incarceration, any more than is
marriage."12 8
The Eighth Circuit used the Turner factors to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of the MDC policy prohibiting transportation for non-ther-
apeutic abortions, leaving only an exception for the life or health of
the mother.12 9 As to the first factor regarding the policy's reasonable
relationship to a legitimate penological interest, the MDC argued that
there is an increased security risk any time a prisoner is transported
off-site, both for prison staff and clinic protesters. 130 Given the defer-
ential nature of this standard, the court agreed with the state.' 31 Next,
the court determined that the MDC's transportation policy "com-
pletely eliminate [ed] any alternative means of obtaining an elective
abortion, [which] represents precisely the 'exaggerated response
to . . . security objectives' that Turner forbids."132
The claimant also prevailed on the third factor, the impact on
prison personnel and the allocation of prison resources, because the
state could not demonstrate a significant budgetary effect. 133 The re-
sources expended in providing transportation off-site for elective
abortions were the same or less than those expended for providing
transportation off-site for pregnancy-related doctor appointments and
124. Id. at 945-46.
125. Id.
126. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 793.
127. Id. at 794 n.2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 792.
130. Id. at 795.
131. Id. at 796 ("Given the deference owed to prison officials in such matters, the dis-
trict court erred in finding the MDC policy is irrational simply because no [security]
problems occurred in the past.").
132. Id. at 797.
133. Id. at 798.
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delivery.134 Lastly, the court looked to the MDC's previous policy that
provided transportation for inmates choosing elective abortions, as
well as other jurisdictions' policies requiring court orders, as "ready
alternatives" to its current prohibition. 35 The Eighth Circuit declared
the correctional facility's absolute ban on transportation for inmates
to receive elective abortions unconstitutional under Turner.13 6
E. Assessing Turner's Effectiveness
The court's application of Turner in Roe v. Crawford provides a
helpful framework for evaluating claims in the context of ICE deten-
tion. A Turner analysis in the ICE setting would permit female detain-
ees to successfully bring claims against ICE detention facilities for
policies that unreasonably restrict a female detainee's liberty interest
in the right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. ICE
detention facilities would be unable to institute broad transportation
prohibitions on a detainee's right to receive non-therapeutic abor-
tions. With respect to outcome, Roe v. Crawford presents a positive
analogy for detainees' rights. Similarly, a hypothetical policy prohibit-
ing or delaying access to emergency contraception for ICE detainees
who have been sexually assaulted could also be challenged under the
Turner standard with a likelihood of success. 13 7 Turner sets forth an
effective framework for challenging prison policies that restrict access
to abortion and related services.
However, Turners deferential standard would only protect detain-
ees from the most egregious policies that restrict access to abortion
rights, such as the prohibition on transportation in Roe v. Crawford.
The Eighth Circuit suggested agreement with the Fifth Circuit's deter-
mination 138 that suitable policies "requiring inmates to obtain a court
order authorizing the abortion" could be sustained under Turner.139
Thus, while Turner would protect detainees from policies prohibiting
transportation, it might not protect women from lesser intrusions on
their rights.
134. Id. at 795 ("[T]he MDC policy does not appear to reduce the number of out-
counts. For example, other than for those inmates released before carrying their children
to term, the MDC would still need to transport the pregnant inmates on outcouns for
medical examinations associated with pregnancy, including delivery.").
135. Id.
136. Id. at 801.
137. See discussion supra Part II.B (noting that ICE's DOM lists no current policy as to
the availability and use of emergency contraceptives).
138. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
139. Crawford, 514 F.3d at 798.
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Despite the effectiveness of the Turner standard in Roe v. Crawford,
it can be a limiting framework for advocates wishing to develop a stan-
dard that secures broader abortion protections for both inmates and
ICE detainees. Notably, the inmate-claimant in Doe v. Arpaio 40 pro-
posed an undue burden analysis 41 for challenging Maricopa County's
correctional policy requiring an inmate to obtain a court order for
transportation off-site to receive abortion services. 142
In Doe, the county's Correctional Health Services ("CHS") pro-
vided only medically necessary medical care to inmates housed in the jail
facilities. 143 CHS arranged for the county to transport the inmate
when medical services off-site were required.144 Covered services in-
cluded pre-natal care and pregnancy delivery services-non-therapeu-
tic abortion services were excluded.' 45 Due to the county's policy
prohibiting transportation of inmates off-site for elective medical pro-
cedures, female inmates seeking an elective abortion were required to
secure a court order in order to receive transportation off-site. 146
As a preliminary matter, the court stated that "[t] he interests at
stake, and the constitutional analysis of any rights associated with such
interests, will necessarily depend on the specific elective procedure
sought. '147 Because this case dealt with access to abortion services, the
court also acknowledged that "involuntary delays in obtaining an
abortion have constitutional significance because time is likely to be of
the essence in an abortion decision.' 48
Inmate Doe urged the court to evaluate the county's policy using
the heightened scrutiny of the "undue burden" test, the applicable
standard of review of restrictions on the right to choose abortion
outside the prison context. 149 Doe relied on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Johnson v. California,50 which held that a prison regulation
requiring race-based segregation of inmates required strict scrutiny,
rather than the deferential review provided by Turner.'5' Ultimately,
the court was not persuaded by this argument.
140. 150 P.3d 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
141. Id. at 1261.
142. Id. at 1260.
143. Id. at 1259.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1259-60.
147. Id. at 1261.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 1261-62.
150. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
151. Id. at 515.
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The Arizona Court of Appeals found that a challenge to a
prison's "restriction on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is
not analogous to the equal protection challenge to a race-based
prison regulation."' 52 Thus, the policy obstructing abortion only re-
ceived rationality review under Turner.153 The court concluded that
under the Turner analysis the policy was an "exaggerated response" to
the County's penological interests. 154 Again, Doe leaves inmates and
abortion rights advocates with a positive result, despite the low stan-
dard of review.
Although Turn's rationality review has proven effective for pro-
tecting the right to choose abortion against excessive transportation
restrictions, courts should adopt the undue burden test articulated in
Casey in order to secure broader abortion protections for detainees.
The inmate in Doe claimed that "a woman's right to choose to termi-
nate her pregnancy, like the right to be free from racial discrimina-
tion, is not inconsistent with incarceration, bears no relationship to
the goals of criminal deterrence or social isolation, and implicates no
security concerns."1 55 For those reasons, the undue burden test is
equally applicable inside the prison/detention context.
Heightened scrutiny under the undue burden standard would be
the most effective method for protecting detainees' right to choose
abortion against a broader range of detention policies. For example,
the Eighth and Fifth Circuits suggested that policies requiring a pris-
oner/detainee to obtain a court order before receiving an abortion
would survive the Turner analysis. 156 However, a court would likely
strike down such policies for placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman's right to choose abortion under the undue burden stan-
dard. While Turner is effective for challenging excessive prison regula-
tions, the undue burden standard is more appropriate for protecting
the right to terminate a pregnancy against a broader range of lesser
infringements.
152. Doe, 150 P.3d at 1262 (holding that the constitutionality of a race-based prison
policy should not be reviewed under the deferential Turner standard, but rather under
strict scrutiny).
153. Id. at 1267.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1262.
156. SeeVictoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 485 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We are persuaded
that the policy of requiringjudicial approval of elective medical procedures is here reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests [under Turner]."); Roe v. Crawford, 514
F.3d 789, 798 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing the fourth Turner factor, and stating that
"[a]lternatively, the MDC could implement a policy similar to that in Victoria W, requiring
inmates to obtain a court order authorizing the abortion").
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III. Due Process for Detainees: Fifth Amendment Framework
As discussed, an ICE detainee's status is analogous to that of a
prisoner. ICE detainees are also akin to pretrial criminal detainees:
"We consider a person detained for deportation to be the equivalent
of a pretrial detainee."1 57 Like pretrial detainees, ICE detainees are
placed in detention facilities while they are processed through the
courts.1 5 8 Once the detainee's case is adjudicated, their removal is en-
forced.159 It is well established that "the Government has a substantial
interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for
trials ... or that confinement of such persons pending trial is a legiti-
mate means of furthering that interest."160 Nonetheless, under the
Due Process Clause, a pretrial detainee has the "right to be free from
punishment [and] to be as comfortable as possible during his confine-
ment."1 61 In evaluating such a claim, the court must consider
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or
whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmen-
tal purpose .... Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmen-
tal objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment."
Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to
a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permis-
sibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is pun-
ishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees
qua detainees. 162
In sum, the legal standard for determining the existence of unconsti-
tutional conditions of pretrial detainees is "whether those conditions
amount to punishment of a detainee. 163
Some forfeiture of rights is inherent in detention; thus, not every
"loss of freedom of choice and privacy" is considered a punishment.164
However, this de minimus forfeiture of rights must be balanced
against "[t] he Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause [which] forbids
the Government to 'depriv[e]' any 'person ... of ... liberty ... with-
157. Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000).
158. Office of Detention and Removal, supra note 30.
159. Id.
160. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951)). Since pretrial criminal detainees have not yet been adjudicated as guilty, the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is generally inapplica-
ble. Id. at 535 n.16 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 & n.40, 672 (1977)).
But see infra Part IV (arguing the Eighth Amendment applies to ICE detainees).
161. Bell, 441 U.S. at 534.
162. Id. at 538-39 (internal citations omitted).
163. Id. at 535.
164. Id. at 537.
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out due process of law.' Freedom from imprisonment-from govern-
ment custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at
the heart of the liberty that Clause protects."1 6 5 Using this balancing
scheme, the Court in Bell v. Wolfzsh' 6 6 determined that policies such as
"double-bunking,"1 67 prohibiting receipt of hardcover books unless
they are mailed directly from a publisher or book club, 168 and restrict-
ing receipt of outside food 169 did not amount to unconstitutional pun-
ishment of pretrial detainees under the Fifth Amendment.
1 70
A. Applying the Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court has held that "the State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned un-
til after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.' 7 1 In the absence of direct protection under
the Eighth Amendment, the Court, in Bell v. Wolfish recognized that
"pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain
at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners.' 72 For pretrial detainees, as well as ICE detain-
ees, the Court has applied the Fifth Amendment.
Several years later in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospi-
tal,1 73 the Court again considered the constitutional protections af-
forded to pretrial detainees.1 7 4 There, the claimant was injured while
being apprehended by the police.' 75 Because his guilt had not been
adjudicated, the Court noted that the Eighth Amendment was not the
appropriate standard. 176 While the Court did not specifically address
the question of the government's due process obligations to provide
medical care for pretrial detainees, it reiterated the point that his pro-
tection was "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
165. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
166. 441 U.S. 520.
167. Id. at 541.
168. Id. at 551.
169. Id. at 555.
170. The Court also found that conducting random searches of inmates' living
quarters and visual inspections of inmates' body cavities did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the pretrial detainees. Id. at 555-60.
171. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 & n.40, 672 (1977)).
172. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
173. 463 U.S. 239.
174. Id. at 240.
175. Id. at 244.
176. Id.
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available to a convicted prisoner." 177 For further clarification, the
Court stated that "[t]here is no reason to believe, moreover, that the
Supreme Judicial Court's analysis of the rights of pretrial detainees
would be any different under the Due Process Clause."' 78 This stan-
dard, however, has proven especially ambiguous as it pertains to immi-
grant detainees.1 79
For example, when presented with an immigration detainee's
claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment based on disciplinary
segregation from the general population, the Fifth Circuit articulated
its interpretation of the standard: "We consider a person detained for
deportation to be the equivalent of a pretrial detainee; a pretrial de-
tainee's constitutional claims are considered under the due process
clause instead of the Eighth Amendment."180 The Fifth Circuit's con-
stitutional standard for pretrial detainees is the same as that applied
to prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Under this standard the
court held that detention center officials were not deliberately indif-
ferent to the due process rights of the detainee. 181
In contrast, the Third Circuit's articulation of the applicable stan-
dard in Dahlan v. Department of Homeland Security18 2 was slightly differ-
ent than the standard used by the Fifth Circuit. In Dahlan the court
stated that
Dahlan's situation as an immigration detainee... [is] comparable
to that of a pretrial detainee. In the pretrial detainee setting, a
claim asserting unconstitutional conditions of confinement is re-
viewed pursuant to the Due Process Clause. The test is whether the
challenged conditions amount to punishment under the Due Pro-
cess Clause .... The inquiry into whether given prison conditions
constitute punishment under the Due Process Clause considers the
totality of the circumstances within a given institution. l83
Applying this standard, the court found that the DHS's alleged failure
to provide timely medical care for the detainee's knee problem did
177. Id.
178. Id. at 245 n.6.
179. Federal circuits are split as to whether a convicted prisoner's due process protec-
tion is the same as his Eighth Amendment protection, or whether his due process protec-
tion is greater. Compare Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the
Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to immigration detainees), and Dahlan v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 97, 100 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the lower court's
decision under the Eighth Amendment even though the proper analysis was due process),
with Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding a more protective due
process standard applies to pretrial detainees).
180. Edwards, 209 F.3d at 778.
181. Id.
182. 215 Fed. Appx. 97.
183. Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted).
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not constitute a Due Process violation.1 8 4 Although the standards are
not uniform across circuits, the Third Circuit's description of "compa-
rable" rather than "equivalent" did not warrant a different result.
In Cesar v. Achim, l8 5 the court reviewed the claim of a Haitian
male ICE detainee who suffered from various medical conditions, in-
cluding hypertension, depression, diabetes, and arthritis.Ys 6 Prior to
entering ICE detention, the claimant received prescription medica-
tion for his ailments, after entering detention, he only received Tyle-
nol.1 8 7 The detainee alleged that ICE had "violated his Fifth
Amendment right to adequate medical care." 188 The court held the
same standard "under the Eighth Amendment applies in a due pro-
cess analysis of whether plaintiff stated a denial of medical care
claim,"189 in that "[t]he protections for pre-trial detainees are at least
as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner." 190 In Cesar v. Achim, the district court concluded that the
ICE detainee properly stated a claim under the Fifth Amendment for
denial of medical care. 19 1
B. Assessing the Fifth Amendment's Effectiveness
While pretrial detainees are to remain free from punishment, de-
tention staff are permitted to maintain security within a detention fa-
cility. 92 Courts must determine whether a detention center's efforts
to maintain security are reasonably related to a legitimate goal or are
arbitrary or purposeless restrictions.193 Claims raised by pretrial de-
tainees have been subject to similar, yet varying standards in different
jurisdictions. While Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners
require intent, the Seventh Circuit has held that pretrial detainees do
not have to prove an "intent to punish" to establish a substantive due
process violation.194 Thus, a substantive due process claim may be es-
tablished under Bell v. Wolfish when "(1) a restriction does not ration-
184. Id. at 99-100.
185. 542 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
186. Id. at 899, 907.
187. Id. at 907.
188. Id. at 906.
189. Id. at 907.
190. Id. (quoting Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriffs Dep't, 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
191. Id. at 908.
192. Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892-94 (7th Cir. 2005).
193. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive
Due Process, 60 FIA. L. REv. 519, 565-66 (2008).
194. Id. at 566 (citing Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d at 892-94).
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ally relate to a legitimate, non-punitive government purpose, (2) a
restriction is excessive in light of that purpose, or (3) prison officials
are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to a detainee's
safety."195
Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that even if in-
tent to punish is required for claims raised by pretrial detainees, this
intent "'may be inferred when [ever] a condition of pretrial detention
is not reasonably related to a legitimate government[al] goal."196 Al-
though these approaches are slightly different structurally, the perti-
nent point is that substantive due process protects pretrial detainees
from any punishment, not just Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment, so a different standard should apply.197
Thus, while case law under the Fifth Amendment has not ad-
dressed abortion, the Fifth Amendment protects ICE detainees from
"conditions that amount to punishment without due process of
law."198 Broad descriptions from various courts expressing the notion
that detainees, whether pretrial or ICE detainees, are guaranteed at
least as much protection as prisoners is promising. 199 Any litigation for
abortion rights for ICE detainees should include a Fifth Amendment
claim-such litigation holds the most promise for securing broad
rights to abortion access for women in detention.
IV. Medical Care for Prisoners: Eighth Amendment
Framework
While Turner was effective for challenging prison regulations and
policies restricting the right to choose abortion, an Eighth Amend-
ment claim is more appropriate for a prisoner/detainee challenging
the denial of medical treatment or services at the behest of individual
staffers. The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual
punishments" shall not be inflicted.200 A corollary to this limitation on
government power is the Eighth Amendment's affirmative obligation
on the government "to provide medical care for those whom it is pun-
ishing by incarceration. '" 20 1 While Eighth Amendment claims are gen-
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1996)).
197. Id. at 566-67.
198. Lisa A. Cahan, Note, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for Action to Provide
Adequate Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 351 (2007).
199. See Washington v. Laporte County Sheriffs Dep't., 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir.
2002); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d Cir.1993).
200. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
201. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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erally reserved for criminal punishment, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "some punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by
the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in
the circumstances in which they are administered to justify application
of the Eighth Amendment." 20 2
Since ICE detainees are similarly situated to prisoners, legal stan-
dards used in the prison context may be applied in the context of ICE
detention. Further, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the deliber-
ate indifference standard employed in the Eighth Amendment applies
to "pretrial detainees." 20 3 Accordingly, in Castaneda v. United States,20 4
the court accepted an ICE detainee's Eighth Amendment claim for
"unconstitutionally-inadequate medical care." 20 5 In Castaneda, a male
ICE detainee was housed at a San Diego facility where DIHS denied
him adequate medical attention for penile cancer.20 6 The court held
that the detainee had "stated a cognizable claim for an Eighth Amend-
ment violation." 20 7 The availability of an Eighth Amendment claim
was not appealed to the Ninth Circuit; thus there is precedent for
providing Eighth Amendment claims to ICE detainees. 20 8
Moreover, since the Fifth Amendment due process framework
dictates that pretrial detainees have at least those constitutional rights
that are enjoyed by convicted prisoners, 20 9 an Eighth Amendment
claim may be warranted regardless of how a court classifies an ICE
detainee.
A. The Estelle Standard
The Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble210 established
the basic framework for evaluating prisoners' Eighth Amendment pro-
tections against cruel and unusual punishments.21' In Estelle, an in-
mate who sustained an injury while performing prison work brought a
civil rights claim under the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medi-
202. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977).
203. Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F. 2d 1042, 1067 (3d. Cir. 1991).
204. 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
205. Id. at 1295.
206. Id. at 1281-84.
207. Id. at 1295.
208. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that public
health officials were not immune from Eighth Amendment claims under section 233(a) of
the Public Health Service Act).
209. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
210. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
211. See id. at 104.
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cal treatment.2 1 2 The Court concluded "that deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."21 3
The standard of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" en-
compasses a range of actions or inactions "by prison doctors in their
response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
with the treatment once prescribed. '" 21 4 Estelle contains both an objec-
tive and a subjective element: "To prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, an inmate
must prove that [s] he suffered from one or more objectively serious
medical needs, and that prison officials actually knew of but deliber-
ately disregarded those needs."2 15
Despite its broad language concluding that deliberate indiffer-
ence to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Estelle Court articulated limits to the Eighth Amendment
protection regarding medical care. The Court clarified that "an inad-
vertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."2 1 6 Mere neg-
ligence in diagnosis or treatment does not establish a valid Eighth
Amendment claim based on medical maltreatment. 21 7 To bring a cog-
nizable Eighth Amendment claim for medical maltreatment, the in-
mate "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."2 18
B. Applying Estelle
1. Abortion as a Serious Medical Need 21 9
Demonstrating that a non-therapeutic abortion is a serious medi-
cal need is best illustrated by discussing how a lack of access to abor-
tion results in a serious medical condition: pregnancy. The Centers
for Disease Control ("CDC") noted the long-term implications of data
212. Id. at 98.
213. Id. at 104 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
214. Id. at 104-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 798 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hartsfield v. Colburn,
491 F.3d 394, 396-97 (8th Cir. 2007)).
216. Id. at 105.
217. Id. at 105-06.
218. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
219. "Serious medical need" and "serious medical condition" are used interchangeably
throughout this Comment.
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collected in its six-year study of pregnancy-related deaths in minority
women. 220 Based on available census data, the CDC predicted:
By 2025, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian/
Alaska Native women [will] represent approximately 25% of the
females of reproductive age in the United States. The findings in
this report indicate that these women have a significantly higher
risk for pregnancy-related death than white women. The report
also found that being born outside the 50 states and DC may be a
more important risk factor than racial/ethnic heritage for some
groups; increased risk for pregnancy-related death was found
among foreign-born Hispanic women and possibly among Asians/
Pacific Islanders. 22 1
This research shows that foreign-born women, which theoretically in-
cludes all female ICE detainees, are disproportionately likely to suffer
pregnancy-related deaths. This observation makes an especially con-
vincing case that denial of access to abortion services for female ICE
detainees could result in a serious medical condition.
The average pregnancy encompasses a wide range of potential
health risks for both the mother and the fetus that must be regularly
monitored by medical personnel. 222 In Doe v. Gustavus,223 a female
inmate brought suit against the prison security and medical staff for
deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. 224 The court in-
quired whether "failure to treat the [inmate's] condition (i.e., pre-
birth, birth, and post-birth) .. . resulted in significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."22 5 Since the Supreme
Court had not formulated a standard, the district court applied the
definition of "serious medical need" articulated by the Seventh Circuit
and utilized by several other circuits: "a 'serious' medical need is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention."2 26 Using this definition, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the claimant's pregnancy was a serious
220. Pregnancy-Related Deaths Among Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American In-
dian/Alaska Native Women-United States, 1991-1997, MORBIDITY & MORTALI-ITY WEEKLY REP.,
May 11, 2001, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5018a3.htm.
221. Id.
222. E.E.O.C. Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html ("It is widely recognized
in the medical community that pregnancy is a medical condition that poses risks to, and
consequences for, a woman.").
223. 294 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
224. Id. at 1004.
225. Id. at 1008 (citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F. 3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)).
226. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Laaman v. Hegemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311
(D.N.H. 1977)).
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medical condition. 22 7 The next logical step to the conclusion that
pregnancy is a serious medical need, is that forcing an inmate to carry
a pregnancy to term, by prohibition or delay, imposes a serious medi-
cal condition on the woman.
In the prison context, courts have applied the Estelle test to evalu-
ate prison policies that impede an inmate's ability to choose abortion.
In Roe v. Crawford, the Eighth Circuit also reviewed the MDC's policy
prohibiting transportation for elective abortions under the Eighth
Amendment Estelle test.2 28 The element of serious medical need was at
the heart of the court's discussion here. While the inmate contended
that an elective, non-therapeutic abortion represents a serious medi-
cal need,229 the MDC argued that "any elective procedure, by its very
nature, cannot represent a serious medical need."230 According to the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of the MDC's argument, "if a proce-
dure is not medically necessary, then there is no necessity for a doctor's
attention."231
The Crawford Court rejected a broad construction of serious med-
ical need and instead adopted the approach outlined in Victoria W v.
Larpenter.232 In Victoria W, a female inmate was informed she was preg-
nant during a routine physical and immediately notified the medical
personnel that she wished to terminate the pregnancy, a procedure
which necessitated a court order. 233 At a subsequent court date, the
inmate's attorney did not inform the court that she sought an abor-
tion.2 34 She was released, but unable to obtain an abortion because
she was more than twenty-five weeks pregnant.235 She later gave birth
and put the child up for adoption.236 The Victoria W court held that
"under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, an abortion
could very well be a serious medical need" but that "[t]he inconve-
nience and financial drain of an unwanted pregnancy are simply in-
sufficient in terms of the type of egregious treatment that the Eighth
Amendment proscribes" 237
227. Doe, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
228. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 798-801 (8th Cir. 2008).
229. Id. at 792.
230. Id. at 799.
231. Id.
232. 205 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. La. 2002); Crawford, 514 F.3d at 801.
233. Victoria W, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
234. Id. at 584.
235. Id. at 585.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 601.
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According to this logic, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Crawford
that "an elective, non-therapeutic abortion does not constitute a seri-
ous medical need, and a prison institution's refusal to provide an in-
mate with access to an elective, non-therapeutic abortion does not rise
to the level of deliberate indifference to constitute an Eighth Amend-
ment violation."2 38
The Third Circuit took an alternative approach to whether an
elective abortion constitutes a serious medical necessity. In Monmouth
County Correctional Institute Inmates v. Lanzaro,239 the Third Circuit con-
ceded that an elective abortion is not a serious medical need akin to
other life-threatening conditions.240 However, the court re-framed the
issue: "Here, the relevant medical care is that necessary to effectuate
the inmates' choices to terminate their pregnancies. ' 241 The Third
Circuit reasoned that:
it is evident that a woman exercising her fundamental right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy requires medical care to effec-
tuate that choice. Denial of the required care will likely result in
tangible harm to the inmate who wishes to terminate her preg-
nancy. Characterization of the treatment necessary for the safe ter-
mination of an inmate's pregnancy as "elective" is of little or no
consequence in the context of the Estelle "serious medical needs"
formulation. An elective, non-therapeutic abortion may nonethe-
less constitute a "serious medical need" where denial or undue de-
lay in provision of the procedure will render the inmate's
condition "irreparable., 242
Accordingly, in Monmouth, the court concluded that the inmates
had demonstrated a "serious medical need. '243
2. Obstructing Abortion as Deliberate Indifference
Under Estelle, ICE detainees will argue that ICE detention offi-
cials' actions resulting in an obstruction of a detained woman's right
to abortion care constitute deliberate indifference. Since the deliber-
ate indifference standard is subjective, 244 the court's inquiry is very
fact-specific, and the claimant's burden to show deliberate indiffer-
ence can be difficult to prove.
238. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 801 (8th Cir. 2008).
239. 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
240. Id. at 348.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 349.
243. Id.
244. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 798 n.7 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hartsfield v. Col-
burn, 491 F.3d 394, 396-97 (2007)).
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In Farmer v. Brennan,245 the Supreme Court clarified the defini-
tion of deliberate indifference. 246 The Court reviewed the Eighth
Amendment claim of a transsexual inmate who was placed in the facil-
ity's general population and subsequently sexually assaulted. 247 Farmer
held that "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." ' 248 The
difficulty of proving the knowledge requirement could bar the success
of an Eighth Amendment claim under Estelle. This difficulty would be
further aggravated in the context of ICE detention by language barri-
ers between detainees and detention facility staff, as well as the varying
levels of cultural competency displayed by detention facility staff.
C. Assessing Estelle's Effectiveness
In addition to the Estelle test's high burden of proof, the standard
it sets forth is relatively ambiguous. 24 9 Application of the Estelle test for
a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official for re-
stricting the right to choose abortion yielded very different results in
Crawford, Monmouth, and Victoria W. Presumably, the Estelle test applied
to the ICE detention setting would have similar results. Courts do not
agree as to whether a non-therapeutic abortion constitutes a serious
medical need. Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue,
any future claim brought under Estelle by a female ICE detainee seek-
ing a non-therapeutic abortion will not have a predictable outcome.
Advocates for abortion rights for ICE detainees should pursue
such cases using the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Monmouth. The
Third Circuit appropriately discussed the intersection of the medical
need and the abortion right by discounting the importance of
whether or not the abortion was elective.2 50 By concluding that an
elective abortion "may nonetheless constitute a serious medical need
245. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
246. Id. at 832, 837 (rejecting an objective test for deliberate indifference and instead
adopting a requirement that the official have knowledge of and disregard for an excessive
risk to the inmate's health or safety).
247. Id. at 848-49.
248. Id. at 847 (emphasis added).
249. James R. P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical,
and Policy Issues, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 109, 120 (1994) (explaining that the standard of
care articulated in Estelle is ambiguous because the Court did not clearly define the terms
"deliberate indifference" or "serious" medical needs).
250. See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 348
(3d Cir. 1987).
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where denial or undue delay in provision of the procedure will render
the inmate's condition irreparable," the Third Circuit broadened the
scope of the right to abortion in the detention context.251
Taken together, Estelle and Monmouth could support broad pro-
tections for elective abortions for female ICE detainees. The Third
Circuit's interpretation of Estelle in Monmouth would likely result in
successful claims for detainees against staff that deny or delay a wo-
man's access to abortion care. Unfortunately, a given jurisdiction
could just as easily apply Victoria W or Roe v. Crawford instead of Mon-
mouth-a uniform application of Estelle in the abortion context has not
emerged. While the Eighth Amendment is the most appropriate
framework to support a claim based on the actions of individual staff
members or officials for denying access to abortion services, recent
applications of the Estelle standard have rendered inconsistent out-
comes. Thus, Estelle does not create a reliable standard by which fe-
male ICE detainees can ensure protection of their right to terminate a
pregnancy against ICE detention officials who violate their Eighth
Amendment right to medical care.
Conclusion
Women in ICE detention are particularly vulnerable with respect
to their reproductive health. Congress has not enacted specific stat-
utes to protect the general health of ICE detainees, let alone to pro-
tect the scope of abortion rights for female ICE detainees. ICE has not
promulgated binding regulations for its detention facilities, nor has it
created adequately detailed guidelines to protect access to emergency
contraception for sexual assault victims or access to abortion for all
detainees. In the absence of statutory or regulatory protections, fe-
male ICE detainees must look to the Constitution for protection of
the right to terminate a pregnancy.
As to constitutional claims, the due process fundamental rights
framework is most effective for challenging detention policies that re-
strict access to abortion services based on the Turner standard. Future
litigation should focus on efforts to apply the Casey undue burden
standard in the context of detention. The Fifth Amendment frame-
work, while useful for challenging institutional policies or actions of
individuals or policies, is most helpful to support an expansion of de-
tainees' rights to basic health care under the Due Process Clause. The
Eighth Amendment is the most appropriate framework to support a
251. Id. at 349.
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claim based on the actions of individual staff members for denying
access to abortion services. However, the ambiguous standard articu-
lated in Estelle has rendered inconsistent outcomes.
Legal and legislative efforts should focus on expanding protec-
tions for a woman's right to choose abortion while in ICE detention.
However, while Congress and federal agencies lag in their attempts to
codify protections for a controversial population of ICE detainees and
a contentious right to abortion, female ICE detainees must rely on the
courts. This patchwork of constitutional claims provides detainees and
advocates with weighty causes of action to challenge detention person-
nel and policies that obstruct a female ICE detainee's right to choose
an abortion.
